JMB Leadership
Until the recent flurry of arrests the JMB had three key leaders, Sheik Maulana Abdur Rahman,was considered the spiritual leader of the JMB. Rahman  was born in Charshi Khalifapara village in Jamalpur Sadar Upazila, the same district where the JMB was founded. Rahman’s father was Abdullah Ibn Fazal, famous for his collaboration with the Pakistani Army during Bangladesh’s 1971 War for Independence. There is little doubt that Fazal’s experiences in fighting alongside the Pakistanis against a secular Bangladesh influenced his son’s radical Islamist views. Rahman is also a former member of the JI’s student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS). The JI sent Rahman to study at Medina University in Saudi Arabia. Following the completion of his studies at the Ahle Hadith madrassa, (“Followers of the Hadith”) he served as a translator and interpreter, which brought him to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India for work. His work as a translator brought him in “close contact with diplomatic representatives from Middle Eastern countries”. Rahman would later travel to Afghanistan for jihadist training and fighting with the Mujahideen against the Soviets in the 1980s; Rahman would later be recruited by al-Qa’ida. He also trained in Muzaffarabad, a known haven for Islamist militants in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. His connections in Muzaffarabad led to future ties between the JMB and the Pakistani Islamist organization, Lashkar e-Taiyeba. According to one report, Rahman’s most recent visit to Pakistan was in 2003. Rahman subsequently returned to Bangladesh where he formed the JMB. It is also reported that Adbur Rahman was the “emir” of the smaller and more radical Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), a Taliban-like militia, which has claimed responsibility for at least two attacks, killing one individual. Many analysts claim that the JMJB is either an alias or splinter of the JMB. Both groups were formed in the same year, are led by the same leaders, and aspire to the same goals. In November 2005, a Bangladeshi court found Rahman guilty and sentenced him, in absentia, to life in prison for his role in the murder of two judges in a suicide attack. Rahman surrendered to the Rapid Action Battalion at a hideout in East Shaplabagh in Sylhet City on 2 March 2006 following a two-day standoff. Bangladeshi authorities executed Rahman on 30 March 2007 for his role in terrorism.[
Siddiqul Islam was believed to be the operational chief of the JMB. He was from the village of Kamipara in the northern industrial Bogra District. Until his arrest in 2006 Islam resided in Bagmara, Rajshahi District, which borders the Indian state of West Bengal. This area has seen an increase in Indo-Bangladeshi tension due to alleged infiltration of up to 6,000 Bangladeshi Islamic Jihadists into West Bengal on a daily basis. Islam was popularly referred to by his nom de guerre, Bangla Bhai (Brother of Bengal), though he had a slew of aliases: Azizur Rahman, Siddiqur Rahman, Azizur Islam, and Omar Ali Litu. Islam fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Similar to Rahman, upon Islam’s return to Bangladesh he joined the JI’s student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS). He became a priority target for Bangladeshi security forces following the successful 17 August 2005 bombings. Government forces apprehended him in March 2006. Siddiqul Islam, like Abdur Rahman, is also a commander in the JMJB. Analysts have conjectured that Siddiqul Islam’s leadership role in both organizations may prove that two groups are actually one organization working under various aliases. Other reports claim that the JMB is the “…youth front of al-Mujahideen the parent organization that began working in the mid 1990s…” Despite varying reports it is unknown whether the JMB and JMJB are formally linked. On 6 March 2006, Bangladeshi security forces surrounded Islam’s hideout in Muktagacha, a town north of Dhaka. In the ensuing gun-battle, an explosion left Islam with shrapnel and burn injuries. He was taken to a hospital in Mymensingh and underwent surgery. Islam was imprisoned in a “sub-jail”, not a secured facility, in the town of Mirpur. Like Rahman, Islam was executed on 30 March 2007 for his role in terrorist activites.
Dr. Muhammad Asadullah al-Ghalib, a professor of Arabic Studies at Rajshahi University, is also a top leader in the JMB as well as the chief of another radical Islamist organization, Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). As chief of AHAB, which is “a mass platform for JMB activities, al-Ghalib was running a magazine, Al-Tahreek. Al-Ghalib was arrested in February 2005. He was charged with sedition at a northwestern Natore District court, along with 14 others.
JMB Structure
The JMB is well organized with multiple wings (departments), which form the structure of the group. It has a full-time force of 10,000 members, reportedly costing $1250 per individual per month, totaling $150 million each year. The part-time members are estimated to number 100,000 and it is reported that the organization has a 2000-man standby suicide brigade.
At the top of the JMB lies the Majlis e-Shura, the highest policymaking decision body of the organization. As of late 2006, Bangladesh’s Security Force’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) successfully arrested all seven members of the Shura Council; Bangladeshi authorities have executed four of the members. Each Shura member is allocated a specific region seemingly to ensure that different terror cells operate independent of one another, thereby restricting information should one cell become apprehended. Abdur Rahman was in overall command as the spiritual leader. Siqqul Islam, (a.k.a. Bangla Bhai) was the Operational Commander and Head of the Chittagong region (Coastal, southeast); Ataur Rahman Sunny, also executed on 30 March 2007, was responsible for the Dhaka region (Capital, center); Abdul Awal Sarker headed the Rajshahi region (Northwest); Salauddin, (a.k.a.Salehin), oversaw the Sylhet region (Northeast); Farouk Hussein Khan, (a.k.a. Khaled Saifullah), (a.k.a. Shaikh Tariq) was in charge of the Rangpur-Dinajpur region (North), and Rafik Hassan (a.k.a. Hafez Mahmoud) oversaw the Khulna region (Southwest). Khan and Hassan have been sentenced to death for their connection to a September 2004 murder in Jamalpur. A third member, Hafez Mahmoud told authorities of Abdur Rahman’s location, which led to Rahman’s subsequent arrest. In total, four members of the Majlis e-Shura, including Rahman, have been executed.
Below the Shura Council lie the finance department, public relations wing, a recruitment branch, and intelligence cells, which are thought to have penetrated governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. Not much is known about this part of the group due to the nature of the work undertaken by these members, which demand that they remain quiet.
Arms
The JMB utilize conventional explosives. The organization carried out its first attack in 2003 in Dinajpur in which three individuals were injured. That attack was organized by detonating seven bombs simultaneously. Subsequent attacks were organized in much the same manner, leaving a very familiar al-Qa’ida signature. By 2005, JMB-led attacks were more confident, though the death toll from the attacks remained relatively low. On August 2005, the JMB perpetrated a nationwide series of bombings in which 450 near-simultaneous explosions occurred in 64 of the country’s 65 districts. Despite the massive amount of explosions used in this operation, only one individual was killed and 100 left injured. Within months the JMB began to tactically shift their attacks to suicide terrorism; Bangladesh’s first suicide terror attack occurred on 29 November 2005 in Gazipur and Chittagong, with two bombs detonated within 40 minutes of one another. The attacks claimed 9 lives, including two lawyers and one police officer, leaving nearly 80 left injured. Both suicide attacks targeted the judiciary, a common target for the JMB whose goal is to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh. The first attack occurred at the Gazipur Bar Association building. The second attack, carried out by Abul Bashar, attacked a police checkpoint near the courts in Bangladesh's second largest city, Chittagong; Bashar was not killed in the explosion. Numerous raids on known JMB hideouts revealed the extent of the organization’s arsenal. The “outfit has access to time bombs, detonators, petrol bombs, and RDX explosives.” Further, the analysis of the arsenal revealed that the JMB has been able to secure its weaponry from regional militant groups in Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, and China. Much of the arms are believed to arrive to Bangladesh via water transport, which places further emphasis on the coastal areas of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar, known havens for radical Islamists. The possible use of non-conventional weaponry by the JMB cannot be ruled out. On 30 May 2003 in Paiya, Bangladeshi security forces apprehended four suspected JMB members with a “225 gram ball” of uranium oxide, believed to have been manufactured in Kazakhstan; a 23-page explosives manual was also found; the believed plot was to create a radioactive “dirty bomb”.
Funding
The JMB funds come from national and international sources, which emphasizes the true magnitude of the organization, as obtaining funds from overseas is not an easy task. According to MIPT, “Private citizens from countries throughout the Middle East allegedly contribute to the JMB, while international NGOs based in the Persian Gulf also provide also provide a significant source of funding.” The Kuwaiti Revival Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), a financier of the JMB, is an international organization that has succeeded in spreading Whabbism within numerous Muslim countries. Funds from the RIHS have aided in the construction of “…1,000 mosques, 10 madrassas, four orphanage-cum- madrassas, and a kidney dialysis centre across the country. The mosques and madrassas were later proved to be centers of militant activities of the JMB.” In 2005, more evidence of foreign links to Bangladeshi militant Islam came to light with the arrest of Maolana Abu Noman Muhammad Amanullah, who admitted to having direct links to the 17 August 2005 nationwide bombings; Amanullah was an Imam of the RIHS-funded Ahle Hadith mosque at Andariapara. In 2002, US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil placed both a criminal and international jihadist tag on the RIHS. The Treasury Department held that the RIHS ”had been stealing from widows and orphans to fund al-Qaeda terrorism”. This led the US Department of State to blacklist the RIHS on 9 September 2002 for providing financial assistance to Islamist terrorists
The Saudi Arabian based charity, al-Haramaine Islamic Institute, has also been accused of funding JMB activities. The Saudi-based institute was banned in by the U.S. in September 2004; further, on 6 July 2004, the United Nations Security Council added the al-Haramaine branches in Albania, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Ethiopia, and the Netherlands to the Qa'ida section of its "consolidated list".[54] Other organizations and “charities” from the Gulf States, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, have also been implicated in providing funds for the JMB. Pakistani organizations are also alleged to have funded the JMB. There are also reports that non-Middle Eastern donors assist in funding the JMB. According to one South Asia Analysis Group report the 17 August 2005 bombings were organized with funding received from the UK. Atur Rahman, a captured member of the Majlis e-Shura, admitted during a confession “the August 17 bombings were carried out with the help of a sum of Pound Sterling 10,000 received from two supporters of the JMB in the UK”. In addition, the JMB is tied to local businesses to fund its activities, such as the lucrative shrimp industry in Bangladesh’s southwest region, specifically Khulna. The JMB is also linked to criminal activity such as money laundering in order to support its activities and training camps in nearly 60 districts across Bangladesh.
Conclusion
Though the JMB has not claimed responsibility for an attack in nearly 16 months does not mean that it has ceased to exist. It remains Bangladesh’s largest, most-well organized and well-financed Islamist terror organization; currently, JMB mosques and training camps can be found in at least 56 of Bangladesh 65 districts. Despite the high-profile arrests of all members of the Majlis e-Shura and the subsequent execution of four Shura members, it is highly improbable that the JMB will cease its operations. Recent reports suggest that JMB members have begun to regroup in Barisal, under the auspices of at least two veteran Afghan War fighters, Hannan Uddin and Mawlana Mohiuddin Faruki; the latter is believed to be the trainer of the JMB’s 2000-man suicide brigade. Various militant jihadi terror organizations, such as al-Qa’ida of Iraq, have lost their leaders only to be replaced forthwith by another motivated individual. The key to countering a resurgence of JMB activity does not lay in the arrests of the organization’s leaders alone. The government of Bangladesh needs to focus on two key areas.
First, there must be greater effort put forth in the comprehensive fight against Bangladeshi militant Islam. The March 2006 terrorism crackdown emphasized the willingness of the Bangladeshi government and the capability of its security forces to tackle militant Islam in the country. However, the sporadic “clean ups” efforts are insufficient and must occur on a regular basis. Further, the government cannot defeat terrorism on its own and therefore Bangladesh must better cooperate with the international community in the realm of counterterrorism.
Second, the two main political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL) must mend their differences, or at the very least cooperate on issues directly affecting national security. The turmoil that these parties have already caused has created a political vacuum that radical Islamist groups have begun to seize upon, as witnessed by the presence of JI and the IOJ representatives in Parliament. Further, the socio-economic services that the government has failed to provide to Bangladeshis are direct results of this political rivalry. Radical Islamists, such as the JMB, have begun to fill this void successfully. To counter the JMB, the AL and BNP must mend their differences. Should this mending fail to materialize, the JMB, along with other radical Islamists groups, will grow in popularity and threaten the existence of the secular and democratic system.

The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism